INTRODUCTION
What's so important about landscape? How has it survived over the last hundred years as one of the central concepts in Anglo-American geography? This chapter addresses these questions as it traces various geographical approaches to landscape research. We look at contrasting definitions of landscape and the methods most appropriate to these differing definitions. The point of the chapter is not to advocate one or more conceptual or methodological approaches to the analysis of landscape, but to point to some of the methodological implications of choosing particular ways of conceptualizing landscape. We trace these conceptualizations and methodological commitments from the early twentieth century forward because we believe that there are certain merits to earlier approaches that contemporary researchers may wish to consider.
Richard Hartshorne (1939: 65) defined landscape as a ‗restricted piece of land.' David Lowenthal states that ‗landscape is all-embracing -it includes virtually everything around us ' (1986: 1) . Alternatively, landscape has been defined as a way of seeing. YiFuTuan (1979: 89) sees landscapes as the imagination, representation or sensory perception of the land: ‗an image, a construct of the mind, a feeling.' Many landscape researchers, however, assume that the materiality and human experiences (cerebral, affective and sensory) of landscape are best explored simultaneously. D.W. Meinig (1979b: 33-4) states, ‗Any landscape is composed not only of what lies before our eyes but what lies within our heads.' In a similar fashion, Stephen Daniels (1989: 218) says that landscape is both material and ideological. He warns against trying to resolve landscape's contradictions: ‗rather we should abide in its duplicity.' Although, as we will show, there have been attempts to formulate post-humanist landscape studies which radically de-center the human perspective, most definitions of landscape continue to assume a focus on human agency, culture and vision. Landscape is seen as an object of perception, ‗nearly everything we see when we go outdoors' (Lewis, 1979) or ‗what the eye embraces with a look' (Vidal as quoted in Ross, 1988: 86) . Simon Schama (1995: 10) traces the English word landscape to the Dutch landschap, ‗a unit of human occupation, a juris-diction, as much as anything suggesting a pleasing object of perception.' As a historian interested in memory and landscape as a way of looking at nature and culture, he finds the complexity and ambiguity of the double concept appealing. Landscape research ranges from structural semiotics in which the researcher is an expert decoder of landscape to post-structural studies of historical and cultural differences in meaning, emphasizing ambiguity, multi-vocality, instability of meaning practices, the productive slippage and interplay of unpredictable power relations. While most landscape researchers emphasize vision, some explicitly work to counter the ‗ocular-centrism' of much land-scape analysis.
Given the diversity of definitions of land-scape, it is useful to ask a few conceptual questions before choosing the most appropriate research methods. For example, is landscape most usefully defined so as to clearly distinguish it from related concepts such as place, environment, ecology and region? In making such distinctions, might it not make sense to retain the relative narrowness, human scale and vantage point of some of the more common definitions? Differing ways of answering the question ‗What are landscapes?' will lead to differing ways of studying them. Methodologies should ideally be open-ended and empirically grounded such that the resulting research will offer fresh perspectives on ontological issues while pointing to refined methods of research.
MORPHOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS
Much late nineteenth century geography was based on morphological as opposed to causal analysis: the phenomenological study of forms and relations as they naturally occur. This holistic approach to science that refuses to dissect and abstract its subject matter was resistant to, and increasingly isolated from, mainstream science that deals with the social, economic, political or physical processes that underlie the landscape. Nevertheless, it maintained a strong presence in geography through the influence of the Berkeley School under the leadership of Carl Sauer. More recent versions of phenomenological land-scape analysis in geography have grown up fairly independently of Sauerian morphology and are far more radical in their methodological implications. The subject matter differs from Sauer's as well. However, the principal goal of an unmediated, presuppositionless encounter with the landscape remains.
Sauerian claims to a scientific morphology were forfeited by later phenomenological geographers who accepted the widespread twentieth century view of science as necessarily abstract and positivistic. While Sauer believed that a well-trained eye supplemented by archival backup was necessary to discovering the ways cultures had shaped the natural landscape historically, his approach has been considered too analytical and cognitive for later, more thoroughly phenomenological geographers. Sauer's view of science can be traced in large part to his devotion to Goethe's humanism and the historicism of German geography. In his ‗Morphology of Landscape' written in 1925, Sauer approvingly cites Goethe's argument that morphology is phenomenological in that ‗one need not seek for something beyond the phenomena ' (1963: 327) . For him, Goethean science involved close attention to direct experiential encounters with nature. Sauer (1963: 327) describes morphology as ‗a purely evidential system, without prepossession regarding the meaning of its evidence, and presupposes a minimum of assumption.'
In contrast to more recent versions of phenomenology which downplay vision, Sauer (1963: 393) describes what he refers to as ‗the -morphologic eye,‖ a spontaneous and critical visual attention to form and pattern.' His ‗Morphology of Landscape' set the course for several generations of American students who studied landscape as a product of human activity that shaped the natural environment. His often cited dictum, ‗culture is the agent, the natural area is the medium, the cultural landscape is the result' was intended to lead geographers to see culture as an active force not reducible to human decision-making (Sauer, 1963: 343) . In this respect, his approach bears a resemblance to more recent work on landscape such as actor-network theory, which also wishes to shift the focus away from individual human agency. However, as we shall see, there are significant differences between these perspectives stemming from the need Sauer felt to maintain disciplinary boundaries and more recent theorists' urge to trace out all types of connections regardless of whose disciplinary toes they may step on.
While, Hartshorne (1939: 65) had defined landscape as a region or bounded piece of land, he also recognized that the concept, having been derived from the German word landschaft (shape of the land), retained a double meaning that includes the aesthetic appearance of the land. He therefore rejected it as insufficiently objective for his vision of a new, more rigorous scientific geography (Olwig, 1996) . For him the idea of landscape was imprecise and dangerously pleasurable. This early view prefigured a major split within geography between those who favored spatial science and those such as Sauer who made no apologies for taking aesthetic pleasure in uncovering secrets hidden within the visible landscape which only those with trained eyes and a background in comparative regional histories could possibly uncover. Pleasure in looking and its enhancement or detraction from successful analysis remains a more or less explicit theme throughout the history of landscape geography.
Sauer writes, ‗One should go down into the field again and again.' He considered landscape interpretation to be a practice with cumulative dividends. For example, his interpretation of the landscape along the road to Cibolla (Sauer, 1963) was based on five field seasons during which he covered the area multiple times and in different seasons. This in-depth observation was then backed up by library and archival work (West, 1979) . There are obvious cost implications of his methodology in terms of both time and money.
Although Sauer was inductive in his approach, he nevertheless formulated testable hypotheses and took contradictory evidence seriously. Robert West (1979: 12) writes, ‗Much of the time, being in the field with Carl was rather like a continuous seminar, for as he saw new country, he tied observations to the data he had dredged out of his readings.' Sauer stated, ‗No science can rest at the level of mere perception ' (1963: 322) . However, he stressed the importance of ‗personal judgment' and an assessment of that which is of value to us. (Sauer, 1963: 324) .
Sauer saw geography as a science founded on a ‗naively given' section of reality to which ‗the experience of mankind' was naturally drawn (Sauer, 1963: 316) . This ‗common curiosity' alone justified the visible landscape as a self-evidently important enough topic for a science to be based upon. He viewed land-scape study as objective, unpretentious, and ‗value free or nearly so' (Sauer, 1963: 327) . The idea that interpretation should be dataled, without recourse to the mediation of theoretical statements, has been the hallmark of Berkeley School landscape research. A strength of such an approach is that it takes data seriously. This is in contrast to much of cultural geography during the past three decades which has been theory-driven, with too little research yielding only thin empirical examples, and much of the theoretical apparatus underutilized. Having said this, we believe (as has been argued in relation to Sauer's reified, superorganic theory of culture (Duncan, 1980) ) that all interpretations are necessarily theory-laden, and that to be unaware or uncritical of one's theoretical borrowings is highly problematic.
Sauer used interviewing, but purely as a supplemental method to enhance his own powers of observation and interpretation of evidence. Sauer then systematically checked out his informants' information against standard scientific references. Over the decades, as the focus of Berkeley school landscape study shifted towards contemporary landscapes, the methodological repertoire was exposed as unnecessarily limited by a generation of critical cultural geographers wishing to broaden the study of landscape to include political, social-psychological and economic practices and processes.
LANDSCAPE AS A PALIMPSEST FOR CULTURE HISTORY
Of course, Sauer and members of the Berkeley School were not the only scholars who read landscapes as evidence of the past. Landscapes were seen as palimpsests (documents partially erased and overlain with newer forms and patterns) holding a wealth of information and clues to their histories by those who were able to recognize significant features and relate these to a larger system of landscape features. American cultural and historical geographers such as D.W. Meinig and Michael Conzen, geographer-journalist J.B. Jackson, folklorists such as Henry Glassie, British geographers and historians, H.C. Darby, Oliver Rackham, W.G. Hoskins, and Richard Muir in their varied ways all see landscape as a deeply layered palimpsest, ‗a priceless archive' (Zelinsky, 1993 (Zelinsky, : 1295 , ‗a record of change' (Darby, 1948: 426) , ‗a continuous process of development or of dissolution and replacement' (Sauer, 1963: 333) that can reveal past cultural/environmental histories to those with ‗trained eyes. ' Muir (2000) offers his readers some guidelines for learning to read the English countryside. He suggests familiarizing oneself with historical changes in architectural styles, considering the geographical placement of buildings such as churches in relation to present day settlements and in relation to evidence of past settlements, using various archeological techniques to survey and inventory landscape features such as old walls, and field patterns.
A similar approach to landscape as a palimpsest can be found in the French historical geography of Vidal de La Blache, founder of modern French academic geography. Vidal saw landscapes as visual indicators of holistic relationships among humans and natural environments, each stamped with a particular genre de vie or way of life. Like Sauer, Vidal was concerned ‗not to break apart what nature has assembled,' to understand the correspondence and correlation of things, whether in the setting of the whole surface of the earth, or in the regional setting where things are localized (Martin and James, 1977: 193) . Kristin Ross (1988: 86) In a similar vein, American historical geographer Meinig (1979a: 164-92) writes of symbolic landscapes that serve as ‗idealizations of American communities.' Examples include ‗The New England village,' ‗Main Street of Middle America,' and ‗Suburbia.' These are not actual locations, but ideal types or models with which observers summarize and identify actual scenes that are seen as reflective of cultural values. The methodological implications of such work can seem mysterious to those trained in more scientific approaches. Meinig refers to his work as art, rather than science. Methods include the slow process of collecting fragmentary evidence from scattered local records and weaving these together into ambitious narratives of culture history. For Sauer, it was the reconstruction of the landscapes of Mexico at the moment of Spanish conquest and for Meinig, it was 500 years of the historical development of the United States. Both put forward broad generalizations based on the observation of particular places; both were similarly inductive. They viewed landscape as a rich historical record, which could be read with the help of archival records, novels, paintings, postcards and other popular images of symbolic landscapes.
Glassie describes landscape reading as ‗cultivating the habit of attention ' (1971: 2 " (1971: 3) Aesthetic pleasure is seen as more than an incidental benefit of the research process. For many landscape researchers the appreciation of landscapes was the original basis of their interest and desire to acquire fieldwork expertise.
POST-SAUERIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO LANDSCAPE ANALYSIS
A diverse group known as humanistic geographers began writing in the 1970s. (Ley and Samuels, 1978) . Some were drawn to phenomenology, not through reading Sauer, but by looking beyond the traditional boundaries of geography to find a philosophical critique of the positivism and spatial analysis dominating the field at the time. Bypassing Sauer's version of Goethean science, they drew directly from Husserl and Goethe. David Seamon (1998 Seamon ( , 2000 carries the Goethean tradition forward into the present. Whereas Sauer had described geography as ‗a science of observation ' (1956: 290) , Seamon (1998: 2) goes further urging observers to ‗plunge into the looking.' To do this one must disengage the rational half of the mind and adopt what phenomenologists call the ‗natural attitude.' In daily life people tend to take the landscapes in which they are immersed for granted. Although this natural attitude is largely unarticulated and uncritical, attention is often heightened by care and intentions.
Whereas Sauer looked to natives to point out landscape features that he might miss calling this ‗the education of attention,' humanistic geographers of the latter half of the twentieth century elaborated this methodology, suggesting far more radically that researchers could best learn to adopt a native dweller's point of view by suspending their own knowledge. Tim Ingold (2000) points out that landscape observers can learn to see by asking others to guide their attention. This idea has led some researchers to experiment with giving informants, often children or teenagers, cameras so that they can record the elements in their own landscapes that are meaningful to them. In this way it is hoped that they can escape their own preconceived ideas about what is important in a particular setting and come to see the world through the eyes of others.
STRUCTURAL AND POST-STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO LANDSCAPE AS A TEXT
The idea of landscape as a text or palimpsest written, partly erased and over-written, has been around for a long time. Pierce Lewis (1979: 12) speaks of the landscape as ‗our unwitting biography.' While some landscape elements, such as monuments, are designed intentionally to communicate and celebrate values, many of the material traces of everyday life are indeed unwitting. Nevertheless, these can reveal much about values, power relations and material circumstances. Gay Gomez (1998) is an example of an activist's approach to landscape. She writes a wetland biography in which she dons hip boots and becomes a participant in the routine activities of people who live in the Chenier Plain along the US Gulf Coast. Diaries and letters help her understand the intricacies of its marshy landscape. Her notion of reading a landscape is reminiscent of Sauer's in that it is measured by the keenness of her powers of observation and her ability to relate this to an outsider's over-view of the region's complex ecology. Her interest in local lives is, however, driven by a desire to communicate their local knowledge and insider's point of view to those who will make decisions regarding the future of this landscape.
Kevin Lynch (1960) sees city landscapes in terms of their legibility and believes that creating legible cities is an important goal for planners. His work on mental maps, although influential in planning and cognitive geography, has been considered reductionist in its emphasis on the individual perception of spatial forms such as paths, nodes, edges districts, and landmarks and on psychological issues of way-finding which excludes sociological issues of communication and ideological connotation in the built environment. Although the work raised a useful set of issues for planners interested in making improvements in the quality of life of urban residents, Lynch's approach has been dismissed as behaviourist in that it is limited to sense perceptions with no way to include the social or cultural discourses that mediate cognition. However, as we will describe below, recent work in neuro-science and ‗place cells' in the brain may reintroduce new life into the idea of mental maps.
Marwyn Samuels (1979) refers to the landscape as authored by individuals who intentionally shape landscapes that accordingly reflect their own individual biographies. Denis Cosgrove (1992: 7) , on the other hand, points out that landscapes are not normally the product of the single, coherent policy of an individual or a state, but ‗rather a function of myriad individual and corporate decisions.' ‗But', he continues ‗at a deeper level, a level which becomes more apparent once we consider seriously the various ways in which those involved represented what they were attempting and achieving … we can discern another and more coherent discursive field ' (1992: 7) . In order to research this deeper discursive field, it is necessary to look into the intertextuality of landscapes, in other words, the textual context within which landscapes are produced and read, which includes various other media, such as novels, films and popular histories. Raymond Williams's (1982) notion of culture as a signifying system provides a framework in which to understand the transformation of ideas from one cultural production to another. The idea of a coherent discursive field or system implies structured practices which as we will see contrasts with other more individualistic or culturally diffuse practices.
Post-structural approaches to reading the landscape as a text, such as James Duncan and Nancy Duncan (1988) , James Duncan (1990) , Trevor Barnes and James Duncan (1992) refer to a greatly expanded definition of text which includes all sorts of cultural productions and is intended to convey ‗the inherent instability of meaning, fragmentation or absence of integrity, lack of authorial control, poly-vocality and irresolvable social contradictions that often characterize them' (Barnes and Duncan 1992: 3) . If meanings shift according to discursive contexts, then they cannot faithfully mirror any reality outside themselves; they are, however, productive of changing meanings. Post-structuralism takes very seriously the idea that ‗a view from nowhere' does not exist. In other words, no perspective is thoroughly objective; all perspectives are partial in significant and interesting ways. Given this belief, post-structural research on landscapes tends to focus on different readings or interpretations. These readings are not only individual, but can be understood as shaped by cultural discourses with multiple and complex histories that can only be very partially traced. The meanings that landscape researchers seek in this case can only be speculatively reconstructed. The principal expertise required would not be in decoding artifacts in the field, but in broadbased research into the material (including textual) conditions of the social and political production of meanings. The latter would require much archival research including both primary and secondary written texts as well as in-depth interviewing. Competing meanings may be of interest in and of themselves or for the roles they play in politics. Some of the most obvious examples are environmental and other planning issues. In our own research we have found that the materiality and apparent stability of landscapes tend to naturalize the status quo. Deeply embedded in landscapes are class relations, diffuse and unwitting complicity and social costs invisible to the eye. Landscapes are usually not as innocent as they appear (Duncan and Duncan, 2004) .
Richard Schein (1997) , Duncan and Duncan (1988) , and Duncan (1990) look at how landscapes are read inattentively in the course of daily life. The idea of the researcher as an expert decoder is replaced by a hermeneutic methodology in which reception and audience is of primary interest and expertise is based on critical sociological, psychological or ethnographic research concerning the unarticulated conditions of individual actions. For example, Liz Bondi (1992: 57) states, ‗I am interested in whether it is possible to -read‖ the urban landscape for statements about, and constructions of, femininity and masculinity, and if so, what versions of femininity and masculinity are being articulated in contemporary forms of urban change.' She suggests that, ‗suburbia itself resonates with assumptions about the beneficence of nuclear family living, -complementary‖ gender roles, and heterosexuality ' (1992: 160) . The evocative term, ‗resonate,' signals methodological challenges. The question arises, ‗Resonates for whom?' Bondi suggests that non-experts, ordinary dwellers of cities and suburbs regularly ‗read' the landscape, unconsciously absorbing cultural messages about social relations. The approach she signals is critical. It assumes the possibility of standing apart from the people who live and work in a land-scape in order to see what is encoded in the everyday urban landscape and the difference this makes materially and psychologically in their lives. It assumes also that it is possible to gain an understanding of power structures whose interests are made to seem natural and thus legitimized in the signifying environments that surround people.
The processes by which powerful interests manage to establish the naturalness of the status quo cannot be assumed, as these are historically and culturally specific. Nor would it be valid to presume too much intentionality on the part of those who participate in designing the landscape. It is incumbent on the researcher to figure out how certain interests are served without assuming coordination of efforts or conspiracy. In her study of a gentrifying neighborhood, Bondi signals the question of whether -and to what extent -the people who inhabit the landscape are victims of patriarchal discourses and to what extent their responses to their environments can be resistant. In order to illustrate the complexity of these issues, she proposes a critical feminist analysis of gentrification.
In the case of such critical research, interviewing, focus group discussions and other methods of discovering the opinions and beliefs of individuals cannot provide all of the necessary data. These methods however, cannot stand alone. They must be balanced with other methods that can analyze the larger structures and unacknowledged conditions of action. Bondi cites research which documents women's spatial activities effectively exposing male bias in planning decisions, however, she cautions against a priori assumptions that often characterize ideological critiques. This type of research utilizes archival research into planning decisions and negotiations over the production of urban space, observation of unconscious behaviour, participant observation, and critical analysis of values and hierarchical relations embedded in spatial arrangements and visual signs. However, as Bondi points out, such work is too often underpinned by a ‗radical opposition between makers and users, between doers and done to … casting agents as professional men, the victims as women, with male inhabitants appearing as beneficiaries, and perhaps, via patriarchal ideologies, as indirect agents ' (1992: 162 ). Bondi's own work suggests that the aesthetic refashioning of conventional gender oppositions can reinscribe these oppositions in subtle ways if they are ‗detached from any challenge to the power structures that underpin these relations ' (1992: 167) .
Both structural and post-structural approaches to reading the landscape as a text can be traced back to the semiotics of American philosopher C.S. Pierce and the French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. A formal decoding of the denotative function of signs in the built environment can be found in the work of social scientists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss (1992) on the Bororo village. Connotation, then, came to the fore in the ideological critique in Mythologies by the early Roland Barthes (1986) which sought to expose the connotative meaning of signs, streets, buildings, planning texts, advertising and the political interests which these meanings help to reproduce. In the most radical versions of post-structuralism, as we will see, signification came to be considered an infinite regress, a play of signifiers unconstrained by material reality.
Under the influence of Lévi-Strauss's research on the structural linguistic basis of human cultures, European and some Anglo-American geographers and urban semioticians began to apply Saussurian principles to the study of cultural productions such as landscapes as systems of conventional signs. Signs are formed by the junction of a signifier (material form -verbal or visual) and a signified (mental concept evoked by the signifier whose relation to the signified is conventional or cultural rather than natural. Meaning then arises from relations of arbitrary, but conventional, difference among signs.
Lévi-Strauss and structural semioticians such as Umberto Eco (1976) and Barthes (1967) (in their earlier writings) decoded cultural practices according to rules of combining, substituting and juxtaposing signifieds. They looked not only for fairly straightforward denotative meanings, but also for connotations or second order meanings in which a sign can encapsulate a whole system of ideas (as when a flag stands for the idea of a nation and nationalism). Barthes drew on the insights of Saussure's structural linguistics to go beyond a static notion of signs whereby elements of a landscape or other cultural production are seen as signs with stable, intrinsic meanings. Barthes looked for structured systems of signs in the environment that could be deciphered to reveal the complexity and instability beneath the apparent obviousness of the everyday environment. His ambition was to shatter what appears to most observers (professional researchers and non-professionals alike) as innocent, natural and inevitable. In this sense, Barthes' work can be considered critical, requiring an expert, distanced perspective.
His methodology is based on close analysis of the processes by which myths naturalize historically and culturally contingent, class-specific practices, values and moralities. He traces the way particular signs have become emptied of their straightforward denotative function and subsequently acquired second-order connotations. Jon Goss (1993) uses such a method to study the way designers of American malls have attempted to stimulate consumption by manipulating shoppers' behaviour through the design of a symbolic landscape that promotes associative moods in shoppers. Goss demonstrates how the land-scape of the mall works to modify emotions, thoughts and behaviour.
Saussure had based his semiotics on structured, relatively static differences between signifiers, especially binary oppositions that depend on each other for their meaning. Later semioticians such as Greimas then continued to look at binary oppositions such as public-private, sacred-profane, masculine-feminine, rural-urban, here versus elsewhere, self and other as principal structuring discourses of landscape. Here the landscape is seen as a text with a grammar that people in the course of their everyday life are unaware. It can be analyzed only by experts who discover the deep structure of its narratives. For such semiologists, signifiers and their relations are seen to shift, but the range of meanings is constrained by cultural structures. If landscape meanings are concealed behind what is visible to passers-by then the decoding process requires expertise in formal grammars rather than ethnographic methods. A classic example of the expert decoding of landscape is the early, more structural, work of Pierre Bourdieu (1970) . In this research Bourdieu was less concerned with fluid, meaning practices than he was in his later work. In his structural period, he analyzed Berber houses in Algeria as embodying gender roles in ways that the inhabitants were unaware. Gender for him was the important binary structuring Berber domestic life.
The Saussurean disjuncture between signification and reality also lies behind such varied post-structural developments as the philosopher, Judith Butler's notion of performativity, which we will discuss further below, and Jean Baudrillard's notion of simulation. In Baudrillard's (1988) study of hyperreality in America, we witness the turning of the crisis of faith in representation into a celebration of the play of signifiers largely unconstrained by material reality. Baudrillard shows how immaterial representations of reality begin to blur with material reality especially in highly commodified societies such as contemporary America which depend heavily upon advertizing and image manipulation. Hyperreality is the term Baudrillard uses to refer to these images, simulations and signifiers which effectively become more real than ‗reality' itself. He encourages his readers to question the concepts of authenticity and the aura of an original. In fact, he argues that all that exists is the circulation of images.
Baudrillard's view that contemporary culture is highly mediated by self-referential signs that are increasingly detached from any sort of independent reality differs significantly from ideology critique in that there can be no unmasking or exposing of myths. For Baudrillard there are only simulations, images and connotations, but no authenticity. There can be no simple decoding of signs to reveal a hidden reality, because consciousness cannot distinguish between simulations and reality in the contemporary world of highly mediated spectacles. He describes hyper-real American landscapes as so commodified that they have become depthless, signifying only other signs in an endless deferral of meaning. Eco, however, worries about the idealist implications of this perspective. There is always a feedback, he argues from the material world, the power relations which constrain the play of signifiers. Mark Gottdiener (1995) agrees that objects in the landscape are unstable signifiers, but sees them as linked to both use value and exchange value through what he terms the exo-semiotic system of capitalist accumulation. He believes that Baudrillard has been led into a methodological impasse where his analysis can only consist of ‗impressionistic observations and sweeping generalizations' (Gottdiener, 1995: 34) . For us, many methodological questions arise. How do we to analyse hyper-real landscapes or document the assertion that all that is left is pure simulation?
One of the best examples of hyperreality as the blurring of reality and imagination in a landscape is found in Dydia DeLyser's Ramona memories (2005) . In this study, DeLyser settles for a less radical view of the hyperreal, but manages to demonstrate the blurring of representations and reality nevertheless. She therefore successfully avoids Gottdeiner's critique. Hers is a study of a fictional character, Ramona, and the places in southern California where thousands of visitors came each year because they believed they were Ramona's real birthplace, home, marriage place, and grave (even though they knew Ramona to be a fictional character). Tourists' emotional attachment to the imaginary makes some sense in a contemporary capitalist culture that places a high degree of value on images, spectacles and simulations that may provide a fuller experience than that which they are simulations of. In Butler's view, reality cannot be represented linguistically; it is made anew each time it is enacted. Discursive practices per-form that which they name (Butler, 1993) . Conventions are enacted through repeated bodily and discursive practices. These conventions appear natural and necessary, even though they take shape only through such repeated performances. Repeated (albeit each time somewhat different) readings of cultural productions such as landscapes produce new realities. Post-structural semiotics sees the multi-vocality of all such cultural productions as undermining any conscious attempts at stablizing representation. Jacques Derrida, whose influence has been strongly felt in geography and in many other disciplines well beyond his own field of philosophy, has consistently undermined the idea of structured binary oppositions by exposing the implicit value hierarchies embedded within them. Like Baudrillard, he assumes an endless deferral of signification. Deconstruction, his method of analysis, looks for slippage in the continual coding and decoding which is brought about by repetition, because changing circumstances mean that exact reproduction of meaning is impossible and contradictions will be exposed. Derrida argues against what he calls the ‗metaphysics of presence' by which he means the privileging of that which is present, visible and knowable. Instead he argues for a permanent state of undecidability. This critique of the visible has interesting implications for the study of landscape which, as we have argued, has historically been heavily dependent on vision.
We see anti-foundationalism and celebration of ambiguity at work in writings of Butler on performance which she says creates difference, not as structured oppositions, but as the instability of meaning through repetition. Repetition entails difference and creativity because meaning is fluid. Contexts change, producing unending chains of signification. Landscapes (and the practices which reproduce them) are performative in this sense of creating new forms and meanings. They can be seen as signifying assemblages that are like written texts, cut off from the intentions of their authors, and open to new interpretations by readers who become their authors. Butler states that ‗places only operate through constant and iterative practice. … Indeed they are performed' (Butler as quoted in Cresswell, 2002: 23) . Over the years in our own work on landscape we have adopted such an approach. Our early work on land-scape and identity stressed how people performed their identities through landscape. Drawing on symbolic interactionism and structuration theory, we were keen to stress that landscapes are not merely symbolic, but that they are ‗performed' as members of various groups act out their identities. These performances are shaped not individualistically, but in continuous social interaction. People invest hugely in landscapes in terms of money, time, political power and other resources not to make them merely symbolic, but to make them useful. And very often much of this use value comes from the role of landscapes in the performance of group identities.
Many examples of contested landscape meanings can be found in our book Landscapes of Privilege (2004) . Here we trace the iterations between identities, contested aesthetics and social justice in the politics of landscape in a suburb of New York. We show the unwitting complicity in social injustice on the part of many concerned with historic preservation and environmental conservation. For example, we show how aesthetic concerns shape the social relations between Latino immigrants and the receiving communities. Racism and abjection dominate the political struggles in one town which attempts to clear all public spaces of immigrants who socialize or wait for day jobs, while in an adjoining town the presence of day labourers maintaining the landscape in clearly marked service roles is naturalized as white privilege. The rich who, as they say, ‗can't live with them, but can't landscape without them,' manage to keep their landscape unspoilt by the Latinos whose labor maintains its valuable aesthetic. We also show in other ways how social identities and status claims are negotiated between families who have lived in a town for generations and those who are newly arrived. Dirt roads that are considered the finest and most valued of landscape features to some, are seen as a symbol of poverty and backwardness to others. Reproductions of old colonial style houses built by newcomers to town are often considered ostentatious because the scale of certain features such as columns, or increasingly the whole house, is considered wrong. What seems a beautiful copy to one person is called a ‗McMansion' or ‗starter castle' by others. The performance of taste and its relation to social class is a very important, but sensitive, topic to many Americans in large part because they believe it is an impolite topic which is fundamentally un-American.
LANDSCAPE AS A WAY OF SEEING
Landscape is seen by some researchers as a form of visuality. Tuan (1979) argued that it is not landscape as a bit of land that is of interest to humanistic geographers, rather it is landscape as the visual and aesthetic human experience. Cosgrove (1984) and Cosgrove and Daniels (1988) draw on the works of Marxian cultural historians, Raymond Williams (1973) and John Berger (1972) in specifying the idea of landscape as a particular elitist, distanced way of gazing upon the land which plays an ideological role in symbolizing and legitimating capitalist class relations and political power. They refer to a historically and culturally particular, painterly way of seeing land that began during the sixteenth century transformation from feudalism to capitalism in Italy. Landscapes were sketched and painted in order to sharpen active seeing as a form of knowledge. John Barrell (1980) argues that in the eighteenth century having a commanding view over an estate was associated with a liberal-minded, upper-class, male with the ability to abstract, generalize and separate the general interests of humanity from private interests. Williams (1973: 120) states, ‗A working country is hardly ever a land-scape. The very idea of landscape implies separation and observation.' Gillian Rose (1993) points out that this painterly, distanced way of seeing is not just classed, but also a gendered way of seeing.
Mikhail Bakhtin (1986: 217) writes:
When collective labour and the struggle with nature had ceased to be the only arena for man's encounter with nature and the world -then nature itself ceased to be a living participant in the events of life. Then nature became, by and large, a "setting for action", its backdrop: it was turned into landscape ….
Along similar lines, Schein describes a shift in nineteenth century American lithographic representations of the emerging urban industrial-capitalist order from pictorial to ‗bird's eye view' scenes. These were not quaint or innocent documents of the built environment, but hugely popular constructed images embodying nineteenth century urban ideals. They ‗contributed to changing the definition and direction of a modernizing, industrializing America' (Schein, 1993: 8) . Views shifted from pictorial evocations of the moral, holistic community to map-like urban spectacles emphasizing geometric order and control over the urbanization process on the part of the wealthy, powerful and the civic minded. In a similar way, Michael Crang (1997: 360) looks at tourist photography's ‗conventions of how to look, such as in framing of the picturesque through the canons and techniques of painting.' He says that through tourist photography, the world is experienced as a series of iconic sights ‗marked in terms of their adequacy to pictures ' (1997: 360) . Barthes and Michel de Certeau both write about twentieth century distanced viewing from above. Barthes (1979: 8) writes, ‗To visit the (Eiffel) Tower is to get oneself up onto the balcony in order to perceive, comprehend, and savor a certain essence of Paris.' The viewer feels both cut off from the world and owner of that world. The distanced survey allows the observer to comprehend, to order and to control the landscape. De Certeau writes of the view from the World Trade Center as a powerful experience in which ‗elevation transfigures one into a voyeur. It puts you at a distance. It transforms the bewitching world by which one is -possessed‖ into a text that lies before our eyes. It allows one to read it, to be a solar Eye, a divine gaze ' (1988: 140) . He continues, ‗[t]he fiction of knowledge is related to this lust to be a viewpoint and nothing more ' (1988: 92) . He describes the view of the whole as illusory, with no comprehension of the highly mobile, intertwining daily practices down below, but only "imaginary totalizations produced by the eye ' (1988: 93) . However, he says, if the view from above is alienated, the view from below is equally blind. Those who live below the threshold at which visibility begins ‗follow the thicks and thins of the urban ‗text' they write without being able to read it. The networks of these intersecting writings compose a manifold story that has neither author nor spectator, shaped out of fragments of trajectories and alterations of spaces' (De Certeau, 1988: 93) . The distinction between close-up readings of landscape and distanced viewing raises difficult theoretical, methodological and ethical issues about insider versus outsider perspectives, the nature of incomprehensively large structures, the limits to consciousness, and the unknown and unintended consequences of one's actions.
The types of expertise and modes of analysis implied by the definition of landscape as a way of seeing are multiple. If landscape is a historically and culturally specific way of seeing, then intertextuality becomes important. Intertextuality refers to the textual context within which a text (be it a landscape or any other form that can be read) is understood. Discourse analysis is perhaps the most relevant methodology because it seeks to relate ways of seeing landscape to the larger discursive fields, the various ideologies, practices, institutions, texts and concepts which structure a specific way of looking. This type of analysis requires the use of various primary and secondary historical sources to gain an understanding of the relevant institutions, texts, practices and power relations that make up the larger discursive field. One needs to look beyond what people may say about their beliefs, values and attitudes. It is necessary to supplement the data from interviews and questionnaires, to find other ways to analyze the taken-for-granted socially produced ‗regimes of truth' that enable and constrain the way people construct their accounts. In the case of landscape, visuality or cultural ways of seeing can sometimes be explained with reference to images, especially images of landscapes. The researcher can look at a range of relevant images to find out what rhetorical strategies are used to produce what Michel Foucault called ‗effects of truth.' It is important to look for what is unspoken, especially when there appears to be a silence about values that are assumed to be unquestionable.
In our own work we have found that there is always an interesting history to the way landscapes are understood. The histories of the discourses that people draw upon in their interpretations are largely unknown by most of the people themselves. In Landscapes of Privilege (2004) we attempt to trace historically, culturally and politically, the taken-for-granted textual context within which various groups of people tended to read, construct, maintain and more generally perform their home landscapes. This proved to be quite challenging as the textual context of landscapes in contemporary American culture is very diffuse, far more so, for example, than that described by Duncan (1990) in the Kandyan Kingdom of Ceylon which was a small, highly textualized and centrally controlled, albeit bitterly contested, religious landscape.
THE CRITIQUE OF VISUALITY
We have seen that Hartshorne rejected landscape for its pleasurable visual qualities, fearing that it would seduce geographers away from rigorous science. Much more recently, Gillian Rose (1993: 10) argued that ‗the landscape which geographers hope to know but whose pleasures escape their mastery is a construct of masculine power and desire.' In response, however, Catherine Nash (1996) questions the premise that visual pleasure is necessarily dependent upon a position of domination or that such pleasure is inherently oppressive. She says that ‗looking is never innocent, but its politics is always contextual and never only or just masculine ' (1996: 167) . Nevertheless, as Rose shows, the romanticism of much landscape description and the heroic tone of geographers' reminiscences of fieldwork in the ‗remote corners' of the world appear to reveal their seduction by landscapes. Due to the work of Edward Said and others whose critiques have resulted in a widespread ‗crisis of representation' in social science, geographers have become critical of representations of landscape and fieldwork that appear orientalist, romantic, or nostalgic. As we will describe below, Duncan and Duncan (2004) and Don Mitchell (1996) extend this argument, attempting to understand how popular (rather than just academic) aesthetic appreciation of landscape in everyday life can lead to the aestheticization of social relations and the naturalization of privilege.
While vision is the biologically based sense of sight, visuality refers to the dependence of vision on culture. John Walker and Sarah Chaplin (1997) point out that vision provides about 70% of all information to the brain -more than all other senses combined. The eyes convert light rays into electrochemical signals that are sent to the brain through optic nerves. The brain then integrates color, motion, depth, and shape into perception of a pictorialized landscape. ‗The fact that we perceive one world rather than five (corresponding to each of five senses) suggests that inside the brain/mind visual information from the eyes merges with information arriving from the other senses, and with existing memories and knowledges, so that a synthesis occurs' (Walker and Chaplin, 1997: 18) . Because such memories and knowledges are historically, socially and culturally specific, a critical discourse analysis will be required to show how vision is mediated.
In her book, Visual Methodologies, Rose (2001: 128) states that the Lacanian notion of the gaze ‗is a form of visuality that pre-exists the individual subject; it is a visuality into which subjects are born … the Gaze is culturally constituted.' Again this formulation of visuality requires that the researcher develop a knowledge of discourses well beyond that consciously understood by the subjects of the research. Rose (2001: 130) says, ‗Since the Gaze looks at everyone, men as well as women are turned into spectacles through it.' She says that this formulation of the dominant scopic regime breaks down the binary distinction between ‗woman as image and man as bearer of the look' pointing towards a more complex feminist approach to the question of visuality open to the idea of shifting and contestable signifiers (Rose, 2001: 123) . In terms of methodology, theories such as Jacques Lacan's assume that discourses mediate vision through unconscious motives. This again requires a strongly critical, distanced view in which the researcher believes that he or she can recognize contradictions, slippages in signification, and power structures that are not normally be visible to the subjects of study. It also requires that the researchers be critically self-reflexive, open to their data, and avoid assertions or over-interpretation.
THE ROLE OF LANDSCAPE IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES
W.J.T. Mitchell suggests that landscape should be used as a verb rather than a noun. Researchers should ask, ‗not just what land-scape -is‖ or -means‖ but what it -does,‖ how it works as a cultural practice' (Mitchell, 1994: 1) . This approach investigates below and beyond the visible surface of landscapes to reveal the complex history of embedded labor (Mitchell, 1996) and the social and economic relations that are materialized in the landscape (Harvey, 1985; Zukin, 1991; Anderson and Gale, 1992; Schein, 1997; Mitchell, 2003; Duncan and Duncan, 2004) . Cultural landscapes play a central role in the practices and performance of place-based social identities, community values and social distinction (Lowenthal, 1991; Cosgrove, 1993; Daniels, 1993; Matless, 1998; DeLyser, 2003 DeLyser, , 2005 . Distinctive landscapes work to establish placebased senses of community and can be mobilized to maintain and contest individual and collective identities and to advance the attainment of political or economic goals. Landscapes are normally viewed in a practical, non-discursive, inattentive manner and tend to be interpreted as physical evidence of social standing and material success as when a large house and garden are seen to represent the economic and/or moral worth of its occupiers. Landscapes have an important inculcating effect as they tend to be taken for granted as tangible evidence of the naturalness of the social, political and economic practices and relations. Duncan's (1990) study of the landscape of royal capital of Kandy in the highlands of Sri Lanka investigated the role it played in the practice of politics in the early years of the nineteenth century. He analyzed the land-scape itself for evidence of symbolism that had been intentionally incorporated into the building of the Temple, palace, walls and lake. However, his primary objects of inquiry were the competing meanings that the land-scape had for different groups of people in Kandy and the way these were mobilized. His work can be considered both hermeneutic and intertextual in that, he offers his interpretations of their interpretations of the landscape with reference to religious/political discourses which were known to all, including illiterate peasants, through various interpretative communities. These textually and politically based interpretations, he argues, were concretized in the landscape in explicit, allegories of kingship, thus opening up the texts to multiple meanings and political struggle.
Although there is little extant material on landscape interpretations, and especially little on the interpretations of peasants, it was possible to use discourse analysis on what little material remains. British spies and ambitious nobles had gathered information on the peasants' discontent each for their own political reasons. This material can be analyzed for information about the attitudes of both nobles and peasants. Because claims to the throne were made through poetry that outlined opposition to the kings' landscape transformations and his exploitation of the labor of the peasants, poetry was an important source of information. Although the peasants' views are difficult to get at directly, rituals and poetic allegories about the building program of a king can be interpreted as reflecting the people's political opposition in a veiled way (Duncan, 1990) . The methods of getting at a subaltern point of view is far more difficult than many commentators whose work is primarily theoretical wish to believe. A good deal of detective work, piecing together of disparate bits of information written in various different languages and a degree of well informed speculation is often required.
In our long-term ethnographic research in a contemporary American suburban community (Duncan and Duncan, 2004) , we investigated the role landscapes play in the aestheticization of politics. Here we found that the effect of the landscape was less well articulated and the readings more naturalized than in Kandyan society where the landscape was more explicated textualized. We looked at how the materiality of landscape tends to naturalize social relations, concretizing the status quo. The town is a site of aesthetic consumption practices in which the residents perform their social status by preserving and enhancing the beauty of their town. They accomplish this through highly restrictive zoning and environmental protection legislation. We demonstrate how romantic antiurbanism, and an anglophilic, class-based aesthetic lend a political dimension to the seemingly innocent desire to live in a beautiful place. We show how a mélange of views on the natural environment, historic preservation, and the claimed uniqueness of a local landscape all work to divert attention away from interrelated issues of exclusion, exploitation and subsidies for the rich. We attempt to demonstrate that the seemingly innocent pleasure in the beauty of landscapes acts as a subtle, but highly effective mechanism of exclusion.
The methods necessary for such a study include semi-structured interviewing, archival research, focus groups, participant observation and discourse analysis. The approach, however, does not privilege vision; neither we nor the residents can see the social and political implications of the landscape by merely looking at it. The difference between us and many of our informants is that we do not have a personal stake in maintaining the landscape; on the contrary, we have an interest in exposing the inequities brought about by its maintenance. It is this difference of standpoint that led us to investigate the history of the landscape, in particular the political struggles that have produced it with an eye to tracing the effects the maintenance of the landscape has on potential residents who are excluded. We argue against an essentialist interpretation of standpoint theory, however, as we encountered many interviewees who, in our opinion, fail to see the structural biases that exclude them. In this, they are blinded by the American individualist ‗hidden injuries of class' still in evidence thirty or so years after Richard Sennett and Jonathon Cobb (1972) wrote so perceptively about this problem. Again, this blindness is by no means inevitable. In fact, we found significant variation among people in terms of their awareness.
This type of landscape analysis entails a critical perspective on the views of one's informants. Informants are, of course, often far more knowledgeable about many aspects of the landscape than a researcher coming in from the outside. In this particular case, while many of the residents know that their landscapes depend upon a politics of anti-development, they tend to naturalize their privilege, having no reason to trace the far reaching, unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions of that privilege. Our object of study is not to the landscape per se, but the socio-political relations that, although inextricably bound to the materiality of the landscape, are not visible to the eye. Therefore, archival and ethnographic research are the primary methods. One of the most important is discourse analysis. In our case, we traced the institutionized ideas and ideals that insulated residents from uncomfortable questions of race and poverty. These included such discourses the English country gentlemen, owner of all he surveys, which appears to sit comfortably alongside the democratic pastoralism of the Jeffersonian small farmer. A whole complex of competing, sometimes contradictory narratives, appears to be amalgamated into a general moral geography widely shared, but subscribed to with differing emphases and connotations.
THE SOCIO/NATURAL LANDSCAPE
Most definitions of landscape are founded on an ontological nature-culture duality. There have, however, been some interesting attempts to unsettle this dualism by rethinking (with the aim of enacting and experiencing) the multiplicity and relational materiality of the socio/natural landscape. These include various combinations of Deleuzean phenomenological, non-representational, actor-network and performative theories of landscape all of which emphasize materiality and embodiment, prediscursive knowing and fluidity, rather than adopting a critical stance towards the more stabilizing forces that structure and constrain landscape processes and practices as discussed above.
Non-representational theory is currently popular among certain, mainly British, geographers who seek an alternative to conceptualizations of landscape which they consider too cognitive, alienated, arrogant, expert, critical and concerned with vision at the expense of other senses (e.g. Wylieet al., 2002) . An underlying phenomenology is evident in many of the key concepts which include dwelling, pre-cognitive perception, affect, care and intentionality. However, as we will show, this work is more radically phenomenological than that of Sauer or the humanistic geographers of the 1970s. For instance, although Cosgrove (1984) and Barbara Bender (1993) had acknowledged the experience of pre-capitalist peasants who actively engage with and ‗dwell' (in the phenomenological sense) upon the land, they made a clear distinction between this and the patrician, distanced contemplation of land-scapes. In contrast, the radical ontology of non-representationalism sees all human beings as inherently entangled with nonhuman elements of landscape. Ingold (2000: 191) , for example, is keen to collapse the distinction between the seeing and the seen: ‗I reject the division between inner and outer worlds -respectively of mind and matter, meaning and substance -upon which such distinction rests. The landscape is not in the mind's eye nor is it a formless matter waiting for humanly imposed order.' Note the language here; they specify neither/nor not both as in earlier formulations mentioned above such as Daniels's (1989) . Non-representationalism aims to dissolve commonsense boundaries in the search for what Nigel Thrift envisions as ‗uncommon sense' assemblages of heterogeneous material and immaterial elements (2004: 89) . Thrift (2004) , Mitch Rose (2006) , Steve Hinchliffe, (2003) and Paul Harrison (2007) promote the idea that the autonomous human subject should not be privileged over processes and flows, connections and assemblages of culture/nature. Hinchliffe approaches landscape through the concept of inhabitation which he describes as ‗not simply a matter of adding in non-humans ' (2003: 206) . ‗Indeed,' he says, ‗it is not about ‗social interactions between already constituted objects' (Hinchliffe, 2003: 207) . The goal is to extend the ideas of performativity to cover human entanglement with nature. For Hinchliffe, the goal is very different from denaturalizing landscape, critiquing aestheticization or analyzing the power relations among historically situated human subjects as we have described above. Rather it is about what he calls ‗inhabiting' human and nonhuman landscapes so as to bring about significant changes to all parties.
Nigel Thrift and J.D. Dewsbury (2000: 424) critique what they see as the limited repertoire of qualitative methods saying that these normally ‗boil down to semistructured interviews, focus groups, and generally shortterm ethnographies.' They argue that ‗co-performance' with non-academics offers a whole new range of techniques for creating new experiential knowledge about embodiment, which will ‗give flesh' to theories of the body. We wonder whether such smallscale ‗co-productions' would have an effect on anyone except those directly involved?
Thrift wants to enact a non-cognitive (or more-than-cognitive) realm in which one can create new openings, creative spaces, resonances, and landscapes ‗where words cannot take you' (Thrift, 2004: 90) . Description from this perspective is not simple representation; it is creation. Methods are seen to enact what they describe (Law, 2004) . The term non-representation (Lorimer, 2005 uses the term ‗more-than-representational') refers to the idea that while representations cannot mirror reality, they do have affective force as practices. This force is largely, but not wholly, non-cognitive. Thrift thinks of landscape representation as a patrician, ‗know and tell' politics. In its place, he proposes what he calls a more modest, democratic, and practical engagement that allows ‗space for new things to thrive ' (2004: 83) . He compares this method to types of psychotherapy that reject the privileged role of the therapist in favour of a mutual client-therapist construction of reality. Researchers aim to discover the ‗unseeable' by becoming attuned to their bodily, visceral emotions; they strive to achieve a deep, participatory immersion in the landscape. They are struck, enchanted and seduced by the landscape. Jane Bennett (2001) argues that the joy and wonder they experience will promote care and hence more ethical practice.
It is not the content of landscapes that landscape researchers are urged to investigate, but the sensible affects that they activate. Affect here, is given a Deleuzian spin referring to an intensity of unarticulated feeling (as opposed to cognitively organized emotions). Because this perspective on landscape looks at practices that cannot be conveyed in words, it presents difficult methodological challenges. In their review of non-representational methods, Claire Dwyer and Gail Davies (2007) point to experimental modes of experiencing the city drawn from work by the Situationists (Pinder, 2005) and psycho-geography (Bassett, 2004; Philips, 2004) . They point to various other methods of research that ‗foreground embodied experience' including working alongside participants to understand manual labour in India (phenomenologically rather than discursively) (Davies and Dwyer, 2007: 259) . On recent urban fieldtrips we have experimented with the use of blindfolds to give our sighted students an opportunity to experience an unfamiliar city with heightened (nonvisual) senses.
One important methodological challenge is how to devise methods that have an impact beyond a few participants. Possibly this can be achieved through evocative writing about the emotions which a writer feels in the presence of particular landscapes with the hope of sensitizing readers' conscious attention to their own affective experiences of land-scapes. John Urry (2007) summarizes a growing body of literature on forms of mobility as active engagement with one's environment which he believes should not be contrasted with the stasis of place or land-scape as these should be seen as actively performed. He suggests various methods of studying the corporeal experience of mobility such as walking through landscapes. However, these are generally vague and most of his references to what he terms ‗mobile methods' are to unpublished work. His principal suggestion is walking ethnography and other ways of participating in patterns of movement in order to gain a deeper, more bodily experienced, understanding of the lives of others as they move through and perform landscapes Jon Anderson tries to produce geographical knowledge by having conversations while walking in order to ‗trigger knowledge recollection and production.' He calls this ‗a collage of collaborative knowledge' (Anderson, 2004: 254) . John Wylie (2005) attempts a Heideggerian selfimmersion in nature while walking in a southern English coastal landscape in order to discover his own bodily sensations and emotions. He says that walking is ‗irreducibly multiple' and not conducive to coherent narrating. However, the fact that he did in fact narrate his experience suggests that it is difficult to avoid re-presentation. On the other hand, had he not tried to make his experiences public, his efforts could have been criticized as merely solipsistic.
Although interviews yield primarily cognitive data, some recent researchers have proposed what they call ‗a walked interview. ' Phil Jones and James Evans (2007) have suggested that particular places trigger memories and moods not always detectable by the interviewee or interviewer at the time of the interview, but which may be reconstructed afterward through a combination of methods. For example, in order to better understand interviewees' embodied experience of a regenerating Birmingham landscape, they combined walked interviews with GIS. Content analysis of interview transcripts was used to examine whether different themes emerge from stationary and walked interviews. Interviews were analyzed to expose the way themes develop through the two different interview forms. They also used tablet PCs enabled with GPS technology during the interviews to record the extent to which comments about particular spaces/buildings are made in/adjacent to them. Combining these tracks with "contour" maps of ambient noise permit an examination of whether certain areas are explored in less detail because of the noise from traffic and other sources interfering with the interview process. (Jones and Evans, 2007: 1) The researchers hope that by matching qualitative data and spatial context they will be able ‗to give a -voice‖ to the otherwise impersonal traces left by GPS tracking' (Jones and Evans, 2007, 1) .
LANDSCAPES AND EMOTION
Much of the work on emotions and geography focuses on memory (Nora, 1989; Johnson, 2003; Legg, 2005; Till, 2005) and some on the psychoanalysis of unconscious desire (Rose, 2001; Callard, 2003; Philo and Parr, 2003) . Material landscapes can be emotive, that is, they can have constitutive or transformative effects on people's memories and bodily level reactions (Reddy, 2001; Connolly, 2002) . New work in neuro-biology may shed light on emotional attachment to places as a bio-cultural phenomenon (Wilson, 1998) . While the phenomenological notion of the lived body and the psychoanalytic idea of the unconscious may resonate with contemporary neuroscience, these approaches pre-exist and remain unmodified by neuroimaging techniques. Furthermore, most land-scape researchers are ill equipped to do the biological research necessary to discover exactly how cultural responses become embodied.
One fairly basic technological approach to measuring emotions, however, has been used by artist Christian Nold (http:/ / www.biomapping.net) who has developed an extensive biomapping project in various cities in Europe, the USA, India and Japan. He collaborates with local residents to discover how they react emotionally to aspects of their local land-scape. Over the last several years he has wired up thousands of people with GSR (galvanic skin response) devices which work like lie detectors to measure the high and low points of their emotional arousal as they walk around their own neighborhoods. They then annotate these mapped journeys explaining why they reacted emotionally in particular places. Nold believes that this technology is useful in helping us to understand how landscapes shape emotional and psychological states.
Cognitive and affective processes and multiple neuro-chemical systems have mutual impacts. Neurochemicals can enhance or reduce susceptibilities and dispositions to engage the environment. The relation between the world outside the body and emotions is especially complex and difficult to study when it comes to long-lasting (background) emotions such as attachment to landscapes or feelings of security associated with places (Clark, 1999; Nussbaum, 2001) . Emotions focus attention on the salient features of an environment and thus landscape plays a role in memory. Neurological research suggests that there may be cells in the hippocampus known as ‗place cells' thought to become active when a person is in a particular known place (Redish, 1999; Rolls, 1999) . These are thought to help to focus and integrate memories, making them coherent. Mechanisms by which both nature and culture deliver their effects (the wiring up of synapses) are the same. What is important from the point of view of landscape researchers is how malleable the human brain is. The synaptic organization of the brain is pre-programmed for cultural learning. The organization of neural pathways is constantly being reconfigured; synapses and their transmission properties are altered by experience of the environment.
Both conscious and unconscious memory processes require that memories be continually re-remembered and reshaped to facilitate the development and maintenance of a coherent self in relation to one's social and physical environment. (Note how the idea of re-remembering, which can never be the same -due to changing contextsparallels the creativity that has been posited by performance theories.) Emotions are to a degree ‗hardwired,' but innately open to being translated cognitively into conscious, subjective experiences that have cultural content, historical and place specificity. Culturally available emotional responses to landscapes shape and are shaped by discourses concerning place-based identities, including nationalism. Landscapes are used as ‗memory theaters,' synecdoches, or aides-memoires, in other words, imagined spaces that can ‗hold' images, desires, collective memories and ideologies. The concrete spatiality of particular places allows them to be experienced in unconscious, practical, sensual, unarticulated and naturalizing ways. Collective memories are constructed socially not individually and must be stored in communal spaces, in public landscapes, not just written texts.
The new neuro-imaging technology and expertise required to carry out research into the embodiment of cultural responses to landscape is largely unaccessible to most landscape researchers except through collaborative research with neuro-biologists. However, as it would be a mistake to arbitrarily narrow one's conceptual framework based on the limits of one's own research expertise, it might be useful to revise psychoanalytic and phenomenological conceptualizations of the emotions, the unconscious, and desire in light of new neuro-biological conceptualizations of embodiment.
One could look at the role of cultural narratives in the translation of a complex and unstable array of cognitive (discursive) material, unconscious thought and bodily states into coherent orientations towards places. Lasting emotions need vivid imaginings and unconsciously processed stimuli. These are enhanced by the materiality of places as sites of memory. The smells and sounds of places as well as visual landscapes can provide this density and can trigger emotional responses to and through places. Gaston Bachelard (1969: 9) says, ‗Thanks to the house, a great many of our memories are housed.' He says, ‗Memories are motionless, and the more securely they are fixed in space the sounder they are ' (1969: 9) . Bachelard speaks of the memory of outdoor spaces of home: ‗How precise the familiar hill paths remain for our muscular consciousness! ' (1969:10) . Despite the epistemological and philosophical chasm between such phenomenological writings and contemporary neuro-biology, we can see that the idea of ‗muscular consciousness' is not entirely unlike the ‗procedural memory' or ‗over-learned cognitive habits' or ‗pre-coded neural pathways' genetically programmed to be shaped by the physical and cultural environment in which an individual lives.
Attachment to places can be thought of as attachment through places to the people, events and ideas one has built one's life around. Places become synecdoches for people, family, memories, security and cultural values. An example drawn from Duncan (2007: 53) shows a young Scotsman in Ceylon who expressed his home sickness in letters written home shortly after he assumed his post as a superintendent on a coffee estate in 1852. He asked for more letters from home which, ‗would be a great comfort to me in this lonely wilderness.' He greatly missed the landscape of his native Scotland. ‗As yet I mind everything as distinctly as though I had left yesterday -every cut in the road and every large stone and all the blue hills and knolls.' He sought in each small detail of the remembered landscape emotional links to his previous life.
Building on this common tendency to ‗place' memories, many landscape features are deliberately designed to commemorate events and collective memories. Pierre Nora (1997) describes how societies use museums, monuments and iconic places not just to represent, but to perform and construct, collective memories. He believes that memories are enhanced with landscape features; they ‗adhere' to objects and entire landscapes. With globalization and migration, as communities fragment and can no longer spontaneously keep memories alive through traditional rituals and shared customs, it is necessary to deliberately construct special public ‗lieux de memoires' or memory places. The fact that landscapes give memories a material form demonstrates the emptiness of such conceptual dualisms as representation versus materiality.
Recent neuro-biological research actually shows how the associations between landscapes and memory work at the synaptic level of neural pathways, just as they do at the level of consciousness; conscious and unconscious thought work together as part of the same system with a person's unconscious thought processing a huge amount of environmental information which it may or may not call to the attention of his or her conscious thought. One can see why research on emotions and landscape is very difficult as clearly such common ethnographic techniques as interviewing need to be supplemented by methods that are not readily available to most geographers. In our own research on landscape we have discovered that emotions and aesthetic judgments are particularly difficult for informants to articulate because they think of them as intuitively obvious, widely shared therefore unnecessary to explain. The ‗cultural turn' in geography and other social sciences has been charged with over-emphasizing the ‗discursive' while neglecting the material. However, as these dimensions are not mutually exclusive, it is possible that they will be most profitably considered in their reciprocal formation.
CONCLUSION
As we stated in the introduction to this chapter, our intention has not been to advocate one or more conceptual or methodological approaches, but to point out the methodological implications, difficulties and possible contradictions associated with the differing ways of conceptualizing landscape. We think that some approaches, especially the non-representational, are especially difficult methodologically with the result that the development of theory is far more sophisticated than the development of methods. Furthermore, the ideal of grounded theory in which the theory arises from the data and data can resist that theory can rarely be successful as non-representational methodologies tend to be weakly developed in relation to theoretical formulations.
There is a strong phenomenological strain running throughout the history of landscape geography. Many geographers are ‗struck' by the sensual pleasure of wild or exotic land-scapes. While, members of the Berkeley School saw such aesthetic pleasure as compatible with expert, scientific analysis, others, such as Hartshorne, warned against seduction by the beauty and wonder of landscapes. Feminists critique the masculine pleasure of heroic field exploration and call for more self-reflexivity. Historical geographers consider themselves expert decoders. Still others critique aestheticization, attempting to de-naturalize by tracing the underlying power relations and exploitation of labor in the production of landscapes. In the 1970s humanistic geographers rejected the position of the distanced, scientific perspective; they tried to bracket out rationality and adopt a ‗natural attitude.' Today anti-humanists (or post-humanists) try to avoid what they see as alienated, abstract analysis, but also reject the privileging of a human viewpoint. Recent foci in the geography on mobilities and affect can leave traditional ideas of landscape looking static, bounded and overly cerebral (Sheller and Urry, 2006) . For that reason, Tim Cresswell (2003: 269) suggests abandoning the term, which he finds ‗too much about the already accomplished and not enough about the processes of everyday life.' He says that although the concept of landscape could be made to ‗grow and adapt, to colonize the dynamism of living geography,' he wonders what of value would be saved in the process (Cresswell, 2003: 269) . We take his point, however we believe that the idea of landscape can be useful especially if one sharpens and narrows its analytical and critical focus. We also do not believe that critical landscape analysis need be static or that it cannot deal with the non-cognitive. In fact, ideas of materiality, performativity and practice, fragmentation, ambiguity and fluidity now predominate in much of contemporary land-scape geography, in critical as well as non-critical approaches. Methodological choices will have to be made, however, -especially over whether the researcher will adopt a critical perspective or not. Although empathic or hermeneutic methods can be critical, the more radical phenomenological approaches are clearly incompatible with a critical perspective which necessarily distances researchers from the objects of their research.
